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Abstract
Vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to ad-
versarial attacks has been attracting a lot of attention in
recent studies. It has been shown that for many state of the
art DNNs performing image classification there exist uni-
versal adversarial perturbations — image-agnostic pertur-
bations mere addition of which to natural images with high
probability leads to their misclassification. In this work we
propose a new algorithm for constructing such universal
perturbations. Our approach is based on computing the so-
called (p, q)-singular vectors of the Jacobian matrices of
hidden layers of a network. Resulting perturbations present
interesting visual patterns, and by using only 64 images we
were able to construct universal perturbations with more
than 60 % fooling rate on the dataset consisting of 50000
images. We also investigate a correlation between the max-
imal singular value of the Jacobian matrix and the fooling
rate of the corresponding singular vector, and show that the
constructed perturbations generalize across networks.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) with great success have
been applied to many practical problems in computer vision
[11, 20, 9] and in audio and text processing [7, 13, 4]. How-
ever, it was discovered that many state-of-the-art DNNs
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [6, 14, 21], based on
adding a perturbation of a small magnitude to the image.
Such perturbations are carefully constructed in order to
lead to misclassification of the perturbed image and more-
over may attempt to force a specific predicted class (tar-
geted attacks), as opposed to just any class different from
the ground truth (untargeted attacks). Potential undesirable
usage of adversarial perturbations in practical applications
such as autonomous driving systems and malware detec-
tion has been studied in [10, 8]. This also motivated the
research on defenses against various kinds of attack strate-
gies [16, 5].
In the recent work Moosavi et al. [14] have shown that
there exist universal adversarial perturbations — image-
agnostic perturbations that cause most natural images to be
misclassified. They were constructed by iterating over a
dataset and recomputing the ”worst” direction in the space
of images by solving an optimization problem related to ge-
ometry of the decision boundary. Universal adversarial per-
turbations exhibit many interesting properties such as their
universality across networks, which means that a perturba-
tion constructed using one DNN will perform relatively well
for other DNNs.
We present a new algorithm for constructing universal
perturbations based on solving simple optimization prob-
lems which correspond to finding the so-called (p, q)-
singular vector of the Jacobian matrices of feature maps of
a DNN. Our idea as based on the observation that since the
norm of adversarial perturbations is typically very small,
perturbations in the non-linear maps computed by the DNN
can be reasonably well approximated by the Jacobian ma-
trix. The (p, q)-singular vector of a matrix A is defined as
the solution of the following optimization problem
‖Av‖q → max, ‖v‖p = 1, (1)
and if we desire ‖v‖p = L instead, it is sufficient to multiply
the solution of (1) by L. Universal adversarial perturbations
are typically generated with a bound in the∞-norm, which
motivates the usage of such general construction. To obtain
the (p, q)-singular vectors we use a modification of the stan-
dard power method, which is adapted to arbitrary p-norms.
The main contributions of our paper are
• We propose an algorithm for generating universal ad-
versarial perturbation, using the generalized power
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method for computing the (p, q)-singular vectors of the
Jacobian matrices of the feature maps.
• Our method is able to produce relatively good univer-
sal adversarial examples from a relatively small num-
ber of images from a dataset.
• We investigate a correlation between the largest (p, q)-
singular value and the fooling rate of the generated
adversarial examples; this suggests that this singular
value can be used as a quantitative measure of the ro-
bustness of a given neural network and can be in prin-
ciple incorporated as the regularizer for the DNNs.
• We analyze various properties of the computed adver-
sarial perturbations such as generalization across net-
works and dependence of the fooling rate on the num-
ber of images used for construction of the perturbation.
2. Problem statement
Suppose that we have a standard feed-forward DNN
which takes a vector x as the input, and outputs a vector
of probabilities p(x) for the class labels. Our goal given pa-
rameters q ≥ 1 and L > 0 is to produce a vector ε such
that
argmax p(x) 6= argmax p(x+ ε), ‖ε‖q = L, (2)
for as many x in a dataset as possible. Efficiency of a given
universal adversarial perturbation ε for the dataset X of the
size N is called the fooling rate and is defined as
|{x ∈ X : argmax p(x) 6= argmax p(x+ ε)}|
N
. (3)
Let us denote the outputs of the i-th hidden layer of the
network by fi(x). Then for a small vector ε we have
fi(x+ ε)− fi(x) ≈ Ji(x)ε,
where
Ji(x) =
∂fi
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x
,
is the Jacobian matrix of fi. Thus, for any q-norm
‖fi(x+ ε)− fi(x)‖q ≈ ‖Ji(x)ε‖q, (4)
We can conclude that for perturbations which are small in
magnitude in order to sufficiently perturb the output of a
hidden layer, it is sufficient to maximize right-hand side of
the eq. (4). It seems reasonable to suggest that while propa-
gating further in the network it will dramatically change the
predicted label of x.
Thus to construct an adversarial perturbation for an indi-
vidual image x we need to solve
‖Ji(x)ε‖q → max, ‖ε‖p = L, (5)
and due to homogeneity of the problem defined by eq. (5)
it is sufficient to solve it for ‖ε‖p = 1. The solution of
(5) is defined up to multiplication by −1 and is called the
(p, q)-singular vector of Ji(x). Its computation in a general
case is the well-known problem [2, 3]. In several cases e.g.
p = ∞, q = ∞ and p = 1, q = 1, algorithms for finding
the exact solution of the problem (5) are known [22], and
are based on finding the element of maximal absolute value
in each row (column) of a matrix. However, this approach
requires iterating over all elements of the matrix A and thus
has complexity O(nm) for the matrix of size n×m. Typi-
cal size of such a matrix appearing in our setting, e.g. tak-
ing VGG-19 network, output of the first pooling layer, and
batch size of 64 (usage of a batch of images is explained
further in the text), would be 9633792× 802816, which re-
quires roughly 30 TB of memory to store and makes these
algorithms completely impractical. In order to avoid these
problems, we switch to iterative methods. Instead of evalu-
ating and storing the full matrix A we use only the matvec
function of A, which is the function that given an input vec-
tor v computes an ordinary product Av without forming the
full matrix A, and typically has O(n) complexity. In many
applications that deal with extremely large matrices using
matvec functions is essentially mandatory.
For computing the (p, q)-singular vectors there exists a
well-known Power Method algorithm originally developed
by Boyd [3], which we explain in the next section. We also
present a modification of this method in order to construct
universal adversarial perturbations.
3. Generalized power method
Suppose that for some linear map A we are given the
matvec functions of A and A>. Given parameter r ≥ 1 we
also define a function
ψr(x) = signx|x|r−1, (6)
which applies to vectors element-wise. As usual for r ≥ 1
we also define r′ such that 1r +
1
r′ = 1. Then, given some
initial condition x, one can apply the following algorithm 1
to obtain a solution of (5). In the case p = q = 2 it becomes
the familiar power method for obtaining the largest eigen-
value and the corresponding eigenvector, applied to the ma-
trix A>A.
The discussion so far applies to finding an adversarial per-
turbation for an instance x. To produce universal adver-
sarial perturbation we would like to maximize the left-hand
size of (5) uniformly across all the images in the dataset X .
For this we introduce a new optimization problem∑
xj∈X
‖Ji(xj)ε‖qq → max, ‖ε‖p = L. (7)
A solution of the problem defined by eq. (7) uniformly per-
turbs the output of the i-th layer of the DNN, and thus can
2
Algorithm 1 Power method for generating the (p, q)-
singular vectors of a linear map A
1: Inputs: initial condition x, the matvec functions of A
and A>
2: x← x‖x‖p . (p, q)-singular vector
3: s← ‖Ax‖q . (p, q)-singular value
4: while not converged do
5: Sx← ψp′(A>ψq(Ax))
6: x← Sx‖Sx‖p
7: s← ‖Ax‖q
8: return x, s
serve as the universal adversarial perturbation due to the
reasons discussed in the introduction. Note that the prob-
lem given in eq. (7) is exactly equivalent to
‖Jiε‖q → max, ‖ε‖p = L,
where Ji is the matrix obtained via stacking Ji(xj) verti-
cally for each xj ∈ X . To make this optimization problem
tractable, we apply the same procedure to some randomly
chosen subset of images (batch) Xb ⊂ X , obtaining∑
xj∈Xb
‖Ji(xj)ε‖qq → max, ‖ε‖p = L, (8)
and hypothesize that the obtained solution will be a good
approximate to the exact solution of (7). We present this
approach in more detail in the next section.
4. Stochastic power method
Let us choose a fixed batch of images Xb =
{x1, x2 . . . xb} from the dataset and fix a hidden layer of the
DNN, defining the map fi(x). Denote sizes of x, fi(x) by n
and m correspondingly. Then, using the notation from sec-
tion 2 we can compute Ji(xj) ∈ Rm×n for each xj ∈ Xb.
Let us now stack these Jacobian matrices vertically obtain-
ing the matrix Ji(Xb) of size bm× n:
Ji(Xb) =

Ji(x1)
Ji(x2)
. . .
Ji(xb)
 . (9)
Note that to compute the matvec functions of Ji(Xb) and
J>i (Xb) it suffices to be able to compute the individual
matvec functions of Ji(x) and J>i (x). We will present an
algorithm for that in the next section and for now let us as-
sume that these matvec functions are given. We can now
apply algorithm 1 to the matrix Ji(Xb) obtaining Stochas-
tic Power Method (SPM). Note that in algorithm 2 we could
in principle change the batch Xb between iterations of the
Algorithm 2 Stochastic Power Method for generating uni-
versal adversarial perturbations
1: Inputs: a batch of images Xb = {x1, x2, . . . xb}, fi(x)
- fixed hidden layer of the DNN
2: for xj ∈ X do
3: Construct the matvec functions of Ji(xj) and
J>i (xj)
4: Construct the matvec functions of Ji(Xb) and J>i (Xb)
defined in eq. (9)
5: Run algorithm 1 with desired p and q
6: return ε . the universal perturbation
power method to compute ”more general” singular vectors.
However in our experiments we discovered that it almost
does not affect the fooling rate of the generated universal
perturbation.
5. Efficient implementation of the matvec func-
tions
Matrices involved in algorithm 2 for typical DNNs are
too large to be formed explicitly. However, using automatic
differentiation available in most deep learning packages it is
possible to construct matvec functions which then are eval-
uated in a fraction of a second. To compute the matvecs we
follow the well-known approach based on Pearlmutter’s R-
operator [17], which could be briefly explained as follows.
Suppose that we are given an operation gradx[f ](x0) which
computes the gradient of a scalar function f(x) with respect
to the vector variable x at the point x0. Let fi(x) be some
fixed layer of the DNN, such that x ∈ Rn and fi(x) ∈ Rm,
thus Ji(x) ∈ Rm×n and for vectors v1 ∈ Rn, v2 ∈ Rm
we would like to compute Ji(x)v1, J>i (x)v2 at some fixed
point x. These steps are presented in algorithm 3.
For a given batch of images this algorithm is run only once.
Algorithm 3 Constructing the matvec functions of the Ja-
cobian matrix of a hidden layer of a DNN
1: Inputs :v1 ∈ Rn, v2 ∈ Rm - vectors to compute the
matvec functions of, fi(x) - fixed hidden layer of the
DNN
2: J>i (x)v2 ← gradv[〈v, fi(x)〉](v2)
3: g(v2)← 〈J>i (x)v2, v1〉
4: Ji(x)v1 ← gradv2 [g](0m)
5: return Ji(x)v1, J>i (x)v2
Let us summarize our approach for generating universal
perturbations. Suppose that we have some dataset of natu-
ral imagesX and a fixed deep neural network trained to per-
form image classification. At first we choose a fixed random
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(c) ResNet50
Figure 1: Universal adversarial perturbations constructed using various layers of various DNNs.
batch of images Xb from X and specify a hidden layer of
the DNN. Then using algorithm 3 we construct the matvec
functions of the matrix defined by eq. (9). Finally we run
algorithm 2 to obtain the perturbation and then rescale it if
necessary.
6. Experiments
In this section we analyze various adversarial pertur-
bations constructed as discussed in section 5. For testing
purposes we use the ILSVRC 2012 validation dataset [18]
(50000 images).
6.1. Adversarial perturbations
In our experiments we chose p = ∞, q = 10 and
computed the (p, q) - singular vectors for various layers
of VGG-16 and VGG-19 [19] and ResNet50 [9]. q = 10
was chosen to smoothen optimization problem and effec-
tively serves as the replacement for q = ∞, for which the
highest fooling rates were reported in [14]. We also inves-
tigate other values of q in section 6.3. Batch size in algo-
rithm 2 was chosen to be 64 and we used the same 64 im-
ages to construct all the adversarial perturbations. Some
of the computed singular vectors are presented in figs. 1a
to 1c. We observe that computed singular vectors look visu-
ally appealing and present interesting visual patterns. Pos-
sible interpretation of these patterns can be given if we note
that extremely similar images were computed in [15] in re-
lation to feature visualization. Namely, for various layers
in GoogLeNet [20] the images which activate a particu-
lar neuron were computed. In particular, visualization of
the layer conv2d0, which corresponds to edge detection,
looks surprisingly similar to several of our adversarial per-
turbations. Informally speaking, this might indicate that
adversarial perturbations constructed as the (p, q)-singular
vectors attack a network by ruining a certain level of image
understanding, where in particular first layers correspond to
edge detection. This is partly supported by the fact that the
approach used for feature visualization in [15] is based on
computing the Jacobian matrix of a hidden layer and max-
imizing the response of a fixed neuron, which is in spirit
related to our method.
To measure how strongly the (p, q)-singular vector disturbs
the output of the hidden layer based on which it was con-
structed, we evaluate the corresponding singular value. We
have computed it for all the layers of VGG-16, VGG-19 and
ResNet50. Results are given in fig. 2. Note that in general
singular values of the layers of ResNet50 are much smaller
in magnitude than those of the VGG nets, which is further
shown to roughly correspond to the obtained fooling rates.
Convergence of algorithm 2 is analyzed in fig. 3. We ob-
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Figure 2: (p, q)-singular values for all the layers of various DNNs. Values p =∞, q = 10 were used.
serve that a relatively low number of iterations is required
to achieve good accuracy. In particular if each evaluation of
the matvec functions takes O(n) operations, the total com-
plexity is O(dn) for d iterations, which for d as small as
60 is a big improvement compared to O(n2) of the exact
algorithm.
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Figure 3: Convergence of the (∞, 10)-singular value. Rel-
ative error of the singular value w.r.t iteration number is
shown.
6.2. Fooling rate and singular values
As a next experiment we computed and compared the
fooling rate of the perturbation by various computed singu-
lar vectors. We choose 1‖ε‖∞ = 10 – recall that this can be
achieved just by multiplying the computed singular vector
by the factor of 10. Results are given in tables 1 to 3.
We see that using only 64 images allowed us to achieve
more than 40% fooling rate for all the investigated networks
on the dataset containing 50000 images of 1000 different
classes. This means that by analyzing less than 0.15% of
the dataset it is possible to design strong universal adver-
sarial attacks generalizing to many unseen classes and im-
ages. Similar fooling rates reported in [14, Figure 6] re-
1Pixels in the images from the dataset are normalized to be in [0, 255]
range, so by choosing ‖ε‖∞ = 10 we make the adversarial perturbations
quasi-imperceptible to human eye
quired roughly 3000 images to achieve (see section 6.4 for
further comparison). Examples of images after addition of
the adversarial perturbation with the highest fooling rate for
VGG-19 are given in fig. 6, and their predicted classes for
various adversarial attacks (for each network we choose the
adversarial perturbation with the highest fooling rate) are
reported in tables 5 to 7. We note that the top-1 class proba-
bility for images after the adversarial attack is relatively low
in most cases, which might indicate that images are moved
away from the decision boundary. We test this behavior by
computing the top-5 probabilities for several values of the
∞-norm of the adversarial perturbation. Results are given
in fig. 4. We see that top-1 probability decreases signifi-
cantly and becomes roughly equal to the top-2 probability.
Similar behavior was noticed in some of the cases when the
adversarial example failed to fool the DNN — top-1 prob-
ability still has decreased significantly. It is also interesting
to note that such adversarial attack indeed introduces many
new edges in the image, which supports the claim made in
the previous section.
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x
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Figure 4: Top-5 probabilities predicted by the VGG-19 w.r.t
∞-norm of the universal adversarial perturbation. Tests
were run for image 3 from fig. 6. Universal adversarial per-
turbation with highest fooling rate in table 2 was chosen.
As a next experiment we investigate the dependence of the
achieved fooling rate on the batch size used in algorithm 2.
Some of the results are given in fig. 5. Surprisingly, in-
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Layer name block2 pool block3 conv1 block3 conv2 block3 conv3
Singular value 1165.74 2200.08 3146.66 6282.64
Fooling rate 0.52 0.39 0.50 0.50
Table 1: Fooling rates for VGG-16
Layer name block2 pool block3 conv1 block3 conv2 block3 conv3
Singular value 784.82 1274.99 1600.77 3063.72
Fooling rate 0.60 0.33 0.50 0.52
Table 2: Fooling rates for VGG-19
Layer name conv1 res3c branch2a bn5a branch2c activation 8
Singular value 59.69 19.21 138.81 15.55
Fooling rate 0.44 0.35 0.34 0.34
Table 3: Fooling rates for ResNet50
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Figure 5: Dependence of the fooling rate on the batch size.
block2 pool layer in VGG-19 was used for the experi-
ment.
creasing the batch size does not significantly affect the fool-
ing rate and by using as few as 16 images it is possible
to construct the adversarial perturbations with 56% fooling
rate. This suggests that the singular vector constructed us-
ing Stochastic Power Method reasonably well approximates
solution of the general optimization problem (7).
It appears that higher singular value of the layer does not
necessarily indicate higher fooling rate of the correspond-
ing singular vector. However, as shown on fig. 2 the singular
values of various layers VGG-19 are in general larger than
those of VGG-16, and of VGG-16 are in general larger than
the singular values of ResNet50, which is roughly in corre-
spondence between the maximal fooling rates we obtained
for these networks. Moreover, layers closer to the input of
the DNN seem to produce better adversarial perturbations,
than those closer to the end.
Based on this observation we hypothesize that to defend the
DNN against this kind of adversarial attack one can choose
some subset I of the layers (preferably closer to the input)
of the DNN and include the term∑
i∈I
‖Ji(X)‖qq,
in the regularizer, where X indicates the current learning
batch. We plan to analyze this approach in future work.
Finally, we investigate if our adversarial perturbations gen-
eralize across different networks. For each DNN we have
chosen the adversarial perturbation with the highest fooling
rate from tables 1 to 3 and tested it against other networks.
Results are given in table 4. We see that these adversarial
perturbations are indeed doubly universal, reasonably well
generalizing to other architectures. Surprisingly, in some
cases the fooling rate of the adversarial perturbation con-
structed using other network was higher than that of the
network’s own adversarial perturbation. This universality
might be explained by the fact that if Deep Neural Networks
independently of specifics of their architecture indeed learn
to detect low-level patterns such as edges, then adding an
edge-like noise has a high chance to ruin the prediction. It
is interesting to note that the adversarial perturbation ob-
tained using block2 pool layer of VGG-19 is the most
efficient one, in correspondence with its interesting edge-
like structure.
6.3. Dependence of the perturbation on q
In the analysis so far we have chosen q = 10 as an ap-
proximate to q = ∞. However, any value of q can be used
for constructing the adversarial perturbations and in this
subsection we investigate how the choice of q affects the
fooling rate and the generated perturbations (while keep-
ing p = ∞). Perturbations computed for several different
values of q are presented in fig. 7, and the corresponding
6
Figure 6: Examples of images misclassified after the adversarial attack (the attack based on block2 pool layer of VGG-19
is shown). Predicted classes are given in tables 5 to 7.
Figure 7: Adversarial perturbations constructed for various values of q. Presented images correspond to values q uniformly
increasing from 1.0 to 5.0. block2 pool layer of VGG-19 was used.
VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet50
VGG-16 0.52 0.60 0.39
VGG-19 0.48 0.60 0.38
ResNet50 0.41 0.47 0.44
Table 4: Generalization of the adversarial perturbations
across networks. Columns indicate the DNN for which
the adversarial perturbation was computed, rows indicate
on which network it was tested. Adversarial perturbations
with highest fooling rates in tables 1 to 3 were chosen.
fooling rates are reported in fig. 8. We observe that bigger
values of q produce more clear edge-like patterns, which is
reflected in the increase of the fooling rate. However, the
maximal fooling rate seems to be achieved at q ≈ 5, prob-
ably because it is ’smoother’ substitute for q = ∞ than
q = 10, which might be important in such large scale prob-
lems.
6.4. Comparison of the algorithms
In this subsection we perform a comparison of the algo-
rithm presented in Moosavi et al., which we refer to as UAP,
and our method. For the former we use the Python imple-
mentation https://github.com/LTS4/universal/. Since one of
the main features of our method is an extremely low num-
ber of images used for constructing the perturbation, we de-
cided to compare the fooling rates of universal perturbations
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Figure 8: Dependence of the fooling rate on the value of q.
As before, p =∞ and norm of the adversarial perturbation
was set to be 10.
constructed using these two methods for various batch sizes.
Results are presented in fig. 9. Note that our method in-
deed captures the universal attack vector relatively fast, and
the fooling rate stabilizes on roughly 63%, while the fool-
ing rate of the perturbation constructed by the UAP method
starts low and then gradually increases as more images are
added. Running time of our algorithm depends on which
hidden layer we use. As an example for block2 pool
layer of VGG-19 the running time per iteration of the power
method for a batch of one image was roughly 0.06 seconds
(one NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPU was used and the algorithm
was implemented using Tensorflow [1] and numpy li-
braries). Since the running time per iteration linearly de-
7
image 1 image 2 image 3 image 4
p(x) mashed potato 53.9% pole 37.6% fountain 55.0% goblet 12.1%
p(x+ ε) head cabbage 29.4% rubber eraser 39.3% carousel 61.4% bucket 36.6%
Table 5: VGG-16
image 1 image 2 image 3 image 4
p(x) mashed potato 68.3% flagpole 37.4% fountain 74.5% coffee mug 23.1%
p(x+ ε) flatworm 26.5% letter opener 19.9% pillow 20.6% candle 40.3%
Table 6: VGG-19
image 1 image 2 image 3 image 4
p(x) mashed potato 94.2% totem pole 43.1% flagpole 35.3% chocolate sauce 22.0%
p(x+ ε) stole 21.7% fountain pen 27.6% monitor 9.76% goblet 40.3%
Table 7: ResNet50
pends on the batch size b, the total running time could be
estimated as 0.06bd seconds for d iterations. By fixing
b = 32 and d = 30 we obtain that the total running time
to generate the universal perturbation with approximately
60% fooling rate on the whole dataset is roughly 1 minute
(we did not include the time required to compute the sym-
bolic Jacobian matvecs since it is performed only once, and
is also required in the implementation of UAP, though dif-
ferent layer is used). In our hardware setup the running
time of the UAP algorithm with batch size 128 was approxi-
mately 10 minutes, and the fooling rate of roughly 20% was
achieved. According to [14, Figure 6] approximately 3000
images will be required to obtain the fooling rates of order
60%.
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Figure 9: Dependence of the fooling rate on the number
of images used for constructing the universal perturbation.
SingularFool denotes the method proposed in the current
paper, UAP denotes the algorithm presented in [14]. q = 5
and block2 pool layer of VGG-19 were used.
7. Related work
Many different methods [6, 14, 10, 21, 12] have been
proposed to perform adversarial attacks on Deep Neural
Networks in the white box setting where the DNN is fully
available to the attacker. Two works are especially rele-
vant for the present paper. Goodfellow et al. [6] propose
the fast gradient sign method, which is based on comput-
ing the gradient of the loss function l(x) at some image x
and taking its sign as the adversarial perturbation. This ap-
proach allows one to construct rather efficient adversarial
perturbations for individual images and can be seen as a
particular case of our method. Indeed if we take the batch
size to be equal to 1 and the loss function l(x) as the hid-
den layer, then sign gradx l(x) is exactly the solution of the
problem (5) with p = 1 and L = 1 (since l(x) is just a
number this problem does not depend on q). Second work
is Moosavi et al. [14] where the universal adversarial per-
turbations have been proposed. It is based on a sequential
solution of nonlinear optimization problems followed by a
projection onto p = ∞ (p = 2) sphere, which iteratively
computes the ’worst’ possible direction towards the deci-
sion boundary. Optimization problems proposed in the cur-
rent work are simpler in nature and well-studied, and due
to their homogeneous property the adversarial perturbation
with an arbitrary norm is obtained by simply rescaling the
once computed perturbation, in contrast with the algorithm
in [14].
8. Conclusion
In this work we explored a new algorithm for generating
universal adversarial perturbations and analyzed their main
properties, such as generalization across networks, depen-
dence of the fooling rate on various hyperparameters and
8
having certain visual properties. We have showed that by
using only 64 images a single perturbation fooling the net-
work in roughly 60% cases can be constructed, while the
previous known approach required several thousand of im-
ages to obtain such fooling rates. In a future work we plan to
address the relation between feature visualization [15] and
adversarial perturbations, as well as analyzing the defense
approach discussed in section 6.2.
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